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U.S.-EC  TRADE  RELATIONS 
ADDRESS  BY  SIR  ROY  DENMAN 
HEAD  OF  THE  DELEGATION  OF  THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES  - WASHINGTON  D.C. 
Have  spoken  on  this  subject  several  times  since  I  came 
to  the  United  states  in  September  last year.  Freely 
confess  that  I  have  often  sounded  like a  skeleton at  the 
feast.  Not  the  thing  for  spring  and  California. 
But  themes  don't  always  deserve  the  same  conclusions. 
Like  the  old  joke  about  Cambridge  examination papers  -
the  questions  remain  the  same  but  the  answers  vary. 
But  before  giving  you  my  answer  to  this examination 
question  a  bit first of  background. 
Why  are  u.s.-EEC  relations  so  important? 
.-&  Should  we  not  be  worrying  about  other areas  of  the 
world? 
And  questions other  than  trade. 
In  answer  I  give  you  several  reflections. ------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------~----
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First the  interests of  the u.s. 
For  something  like  100  years after  the Civil war  foreign 
trade did  not  account  for  more  than  3-4%  of American 
GNP.  Then  in  the  1970's it took  off.  In  1980  it 
accounted  for  nearly  9%.  Something  like one  fifth of 
American  industrial production  is exported.  4  out of 
every  5  manufacturing  jobs  created  in  the  u.s.  between 
1977  and  1980  were  linked  to exports. 
So  foreign  trade  is vital to American  jobs  and  the 
American  standard  of  living.  Unemployment  now  is  the 
highest  for  40  years.  What  would  it be  if your  foreign 
trade  collapsed? 
Then  your  interests  in  Community  market 
With  the  Community  as  a  trading  partner  in  1980  you  ran 
with  us  a  surplus of  25  billion dollars  on  merchandise 
trade,  7  billion  in  the  agricultural  field. 
Our  joint world  responsibility 
The  u.s.-EEC  together account  for  one  third of  world 
trade.  Nearly  half  if you  count  trade  between  the 
members  of  the  European  Communities. 
We  are  the  world's  biggest  trading  partners  and  thus  our - 3  -
relationship is  fundamental  to  the  survival of  the  open 
world  trading  system. 
But  dangers  prowl  around  like medieval  beasts  in  the 
forest  - some  in  the American  forest  and  some  beyond 
these  shores. 
First,  the  economic  depression 
The  current  recession  now  ending  started  in July 1981, 
and  has  been  longer  and  deeper  than  any  post-war 
depression.  So  unemployment  the  highest  in  40  years  at 
nearly  12  million. 
Some  bright spots  - inflation  down  to  below  5%. 
Interest rates  have  fallen. 
A  recovery  certain this year.  But  how  quickly  and  how 
strong.  The  indicators  are  giving  some  conflicting 
signals.  And  all this  has  not  exactly discouraged 
protectionism. 
Then  the  strong dollar 
Unemployment  and  low  capacity utilisation generally call 
for  selective measures.  More  general  protectionist - 4  -
pressures  from  over-valuation of  the  dollar. 
Let  us  look  back  on  the  '70's.  In  the  final  phase  of  the 
breakdown  of  the Bretton Woods  system,  the dollar was 
over-valued  by  some  15%.  Result  :  the Mills Bill  in  1970 
and  the  Burke  Hartke  Bill. 
In  1976-77  the dollar was  again  over-valued.  The  number 
of  times  anti-dumping  or  counterfeiting  duties  were 
imposed  or escape  clauses  invoked  rose  from  5  in  1975  to 
26  in  1976.  In  1974  unemployment  was  high  but  the  dollar 
and  the  current  account  then  in  equilibrium the  Trade 
Act  basis of  the  Tokyo  Round  was  passed.  But  the  dollar 
is  now  substantially over  the  '80  level,  the  yen still 
substantially lower. 
Result  :  rising  protectionism,  a  struggle  in Congress 
over  Domestic  Content Bill,  a  Bill  in  clear violation 
both  of  the  principles of  the  GATT  and  the  Ministerial 
declaration at  GATT  meeting  end  November. 
These  are  some  difficulties  to  be  seen  in  the u.s. 
But  of  course  the  scene  ranges  wider  than  that.  What  is 
badly  needed  in  1983  world  wide  is  economic  expansion. - 5  -
Hopes  of  economic  recovery may  already  have  damaged 
business  and  consumer  confidence  so  that  spending  plans 
continue  to  be  deferred  and  financing  constraints might 
be  more  severe  than  predicted. 
"Hope  deferred"  as  the  poet  said,  "maketh  the  heart 
sick". 
Unless  we  can  break  out  of  the  world  economic  recession 
the  strains  on  the  one  world  trading  system are  going  to 
be  greater  than  anything  we  have  seen  for  the  last  35 
years. 
Then  our major  and  continuing  anxieties  about  the 
ability of  debt-ridden  countries  including  some  of  the 
biggest  in  the  developing  world  - and  some  of  the  major 
companies  - to  repay  and  reservice  their bank 
borrowings. 
Then  the  strains  imposed  on  the  world  trading  system  by 
out  of  line exchange  rates,  a  situation where  the  dollar 
is substantially over-valued  and  the  Yen  undervalued  is 
a  recipe  for  mayhem. - 6  -
Only  a  few  months  ago  the  whole  stormy  scene  was 
complicated  by  increasing  tensions  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic - steel,  the  pipeline  and  the  run  up  to  the 
GATT  Ministerial meeting. 
But  then  in  October  and  November  some  of  the  clouds 
began  to lift. 
On  steel we  cut  a  deal. 
Not  a  copybook  solution  but  anyone  who  criticises it 
should  be  reminded  of  Clement Attlee's  comment  when 
asked what  life was  like at  the  age  of  80,  "Better"  he 
said,  "than  the  alternative". 
The  pipeline  sanctions  were  lifted. 
We  have  begun  to  search  for  a  common  approach  on  the 
difficult but  important  subject of  economic  relations 
with  the  Soviet Bloc. 
Then  the  GATT  Ministerial meeting.  This,  the  first for 
nine  years,  ended  at  10  to  5  on  the  morning  of  Monday 
November  29th. 
The  reception of  this  by  the  press  was  divided. .. 
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We  in  the  Community  thought  it a  useful  and  successful, 
though  necessarily  not  sensational meeting.  It 
corresponded  pretty well  exactly  to what  we  thought 
possible when  we  first started planning  the  meeting  18 
months  ago. 
There  could  not  be  new  negotiations  because  the  results 
of  the  Tokyo  Round  were  still being  digested.  And  a 
study  on  services will  need  a  couple  of years  of  careful 
charting  of  the  ground  before  we  can  see  our  way  to  a 
negotiation.  What  could  be  done  was  a  realistic 
recommitment  against protectionism on  the  part of  the 
world's  trading Ministers  and  a  useful  programme  of 
work,  services  - some  further  work  on  safeguards,  a 
study  on  agricultural export  subsidies  and  other 
relevant  forms  of  agricultural protection. 
It is  true that  there  were  some  exaggerated  expectations 
particularly on  agriculture.  But  we  have  consistently 
made  it clear that  we  were  not  willing  to  re-open  one 
sector of  a  very difficult and  hard  fought  negotiation 
only  three  years after  the  conclusion  of  the  Tokyo - 8  -
Round.  All  the  more. so since  we  do  not  notice  any  great 
interest elsewhere  in  re-opening  other parts  such  as  the 
tariff  on  woollen  textiles  in  some  of our main  markets. 
But  agriculture  remains  a  difficulty between  us. 
Here  on  this  side of  the Atlantic  the  Common 
Agricultural  Policy  has  been  built up  as  some  kind  of 
fiendish  plot  by  Europeans  to  impoverish American 
farmers.  So  since  a  good  deal will  be  heard  on  this  in 
1983 let me,  say  a  few  words  about  it. 
Why,  you  may  ask,  should  we  have  a  Common  Agricultural 
Policy? 
Why  not  simply let the market  work? 
The  answer  is  rooted  in  the  history of  our  Community. 
In  1957  the original  six member  countries  of  the  EEC 
faced  a  major  problem  in  freeing  trade  internally. 
Freeing  trade  in  industrial goods  could  largely  be 
achieved  by  cutting  tariffs. 
This  would  not  have  been  acceptable  without  freeing 
trade  also  in agricultural  goods. 
But  the  very different agricultural  structures  in  the 
Member  States  and  the  different varieties of  protection 
meant  that  simply  cutting tariffs for agricultural - 9  -
products  would  have  been  largely meaningless.  The  only 
solution was  the  harmonisation  of  these  different 
agricultural policies  in  a  common  European  policy.  Thus 
the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  became  a  key  element  in  a 
European  integration.  Without  it there  could  be  no 
Community. 
What  is  the  CAP  trying  to  do? 
The  CAP's  goals  are  very  much  the  same  as  those  of  the 
u.s.  farm  policy  : 
to  increase productivity 
to secure  a  fair  standard of  living  for  the  farm 
population 
market  stability 
supply  assurance 
-.  and  reasonable  consumer  prices 
The  means  by  which  these  objectives  were  sought  - a 
uniform  internal price  level,  export  refunds  when  this 
is higher  than  the  world  market  and  variable  levies  on 
imports  below  this  internal price  - are well  known  to 
those  who  are  interested  and  incomprehensible  to  those - 10  -
who  are  not. 
What  you  will want  to  know  is  how  was  the  policy worked 
out. 
Here  let me  deal with  two  illusions. 
The  first  is  that  the  CAP  has  helped  to maintain 
outdated  structures.  The  fact,  however,  is that  over  the 
last  20  years  the  E.C.  labour  force  occupied  in 
agriculture,  has  decreased  by  half  from  18  million  to 
less  than  9  million  including  the  farm  force  in  Greece, 
the E.C.'s  newest  member.  During  the  same  period  the 
average  farm  size  doubled  to  about  45  acres  and 
productivity rose  sharply. 
Another  illusion  is  that  the  CAP  has  featherbedded  its 
farmers.  Average  farm  income  just kept  pace  with 
industrial  income  until  1975  but  since  1976  real  farm 
income  has  remained  stagnant at  least~  in  1979  and  1980 
it actually fell. 
On  prices,  these  have  been  stabilised generally at  a 
higher level  than  in  the  u.s.  but  assurance of  supply 
like any  insurance  policy,  costs  and  real prices  for  a - 11  -
number  of  foodstuffs  have  fallen  in  recent years.  Where 
we  have  exceeded  self-sufficiency,  we  have  adopted 
measures  to discourage  over  production  and  we  have 
increased  our  dependance  on  outside  suppliers  for 
products  of particular interest to  the  u.s.  such  as 
soybeans  and  corn  gluten  feed. 
Then  it is alleged  that  we  have  built a  trade  wall 
around  our  imports  of  farm  goods. 
The  European  Community  is  in  fact  the  biggest  importer 
of  agricultural  goods  in  the  world.  In  1980  it accounted 
for  a  quarter of all world  agricultural  imports  and  it 
ran  a  trade deficit  on  agriculture  of  29  billion 
dollars;  its deficit with  the  u.s.  in  this areas  was  no 
less  than  7  billion dollars making  it the  American 
farmer's  largest customer.  The  9  billion dollars  worth 
of  u.s.  farm products  which  the  E.C.  bought  in  1981 
{half of  them  carne  in  duty  and  levy  free)  included  2.8 
billion dollars  of  soybeans,  1.7 grains  and  cereal 
preparations,  1.6 of  animal  foodstuffs  and  680  million 
dollars  of  fruits  and  vegetables.  Only  about  15%  of  EEC 
farm  imports  from  industrialised countries entered 
subject  to  levy  and  duty.  Nearly all  imports  from - 12  -
developing countries enter  the  EEC  levy  free  and  at very 
low duties  if there  are  any  duties  at all. 
But  it is  argued  that  the  Community  has  turned  for 
various  products  from  a  net  importer  to  a  net  exporter. 
True.  But  in  the  1950's  large  sections of  European 
agriculture were  inefficient  and  out  of date. 
The  CAP  has  brought  about  a  revolution  in productivity. 
Just  as  productivity has  increased  in  the  u.s.  so it has 
in  the  E.C. 
In  both  countries  for  example  yields of cereals  have 
doubled  over  the  last  20  years  due  to  better seeds  and 
cultivation techniques. 
Then  we  come  to  the  argument  about  subsidies. 
Has  not  this major  expansion  of  EEC  export  of  farm 
products  been  based  on  large  government  subsidies? 
Both  the  u.s.  and  the  EC  subsidise  their agriculture. 
Comparisons  of expenditure  are  difficult because  methods 
of  support  as  well  as  budgetary  treatmrnt are  different. - 13  -
Moreover,  public expenditure  is only  one  element 
influencing  the  farmer's  income.  For  example,  u.s. 
measures  such  as  import-supporting  restrictions on 
sugar,  dairy  and  beef products  have  an  income-supporting 
affect without  requiring  a  public expenditure.  But  the 
level  of  price  support  is substantial  on  both  sides  of 
the Atlantic.  In  1982  EC  farm  support  expenditures, 
originally programmed  at nearly  $13.5  billion maximum  is 
.  now  likely to amount  to $12.3  billion.  In  the u.s.  in 
the  same  year,  federal  income  support  for  agriculture 
has  been  estimated at nearly  $12  billion. 
In  1982  the  farm  budgets  of  the  EC  and  its Member  states 
together  amounted  to nearly  the  same  amount  as  the u.s. 
federal  budget  for  agriculture,  namely  $30  billion. 
Since  the agricultural work-force  of  the  u.s.  (3.3 
million)  is  now  not  much  more  than  a  third of  that of 
the  EC  (just under  9  million,  including  the  newest 
Member States- Greece),  it is clear that  total u.s. 
Government  agricultural expenditure per  farmer  is higher 
than  that of  the  EC. 
It was  in  the  light of  these  facts  that  the  Tokyo  Round 
to which  the  u.s.  was  a  party  recognised agricultural ----------------------------
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export  subsidies  and  agreed  that  these  were  permitted 
providing  that  they  do  not  allow  any  GATT  contracting 
party  to  secure  by  these  means  more  than  an  equitable 
share  of  world  trade. 
I  set out  these  facts  in  order to  try and  show  you  that 
the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  is not  a  devilish plot, 
nor  is it responsible  for  the  present very difficult 
state of  u.s.  agriculture. 
These  are  the  results of  far  more  telling factors  such 
as  high  interest rates,  a  strong  dollar,  lower  exports 
to  the Soviet  Union,  record  harvests  and  the  world 
recession. 
But  has  the  rule  about  equitable  shares  been  observed? 
u.s.  exports  of  farm products  have  fallen more  by  value 
than  by  volume  simply  reflecting  the  point made  earlier 
about  the  strength of  the  dollar. 
And  one  other piece  of  evidence  tells  in  the EC's 
favour.  If  one  looks  at  the  breakdown  of American 
exports  in  volume  between  1981  and  1982 most  products 
are  either stable or expanding.  One  notable  exception  is 
corn.  If exports  of  corn  had  remained  in  1982  at the 
same  level as  1981  the  volume  of u.s.  exports  would  not ~-----~-~~--~---~ -------------
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only  have  increased,  their overall value  would  have 
remained  the  same.  But  the  Community  is  not  an  exporter 
of  corn. 
One  or  two  other points.  Let  us  take  wheat  and  wheat 
flour which  account  for  nearly  one  third of u.s.  exports 
of  farm products  by  volume.  If one  takes  the  years 
1968/1969  and  1970/1971  in  comparison  with  the  years 
1979/1980  and  1981/  1982  the  percentage  of  the  world 
market  taken  by  the  Community  rose  from  10.3%  to  13.7%. 
The  u.s.  share  rose  from  33.7%  to  45.6%.  These  figures 
speak  for  themselves.  Take  butter.  EEC  butter exports  in 
1981  decreased  by  102  thousand  tons  or  17%,  whereas 
non-EEC  countries,  notably  because  of u.s.  intervention 
- increased their exports  by  71  thousand  tons  and 
thereby  reduced  the  EEC  market  share  from  63.2%  in  1980 
to  54.1%  in  1981.  In  1982  a  further  fall of  some  further 
100  thousand  tons  in  EEC  exports  is  forecast.  Again  let 
us  take  poultry.  Community  exports  have  been 
substantially higher  than  those  of  the u.s.  Yet  our 
share  of  the  world  market  fell  from  just under  55%  for 
the years  1975-1976-1977  to  43.2%  in  1982.  The  u.s. 
share  also fell  from  38.5%  to  24.9%.  But  the  real  cause 
of all this  was  an  increase  in  subsidised  exports  from - 16  -
Brazil  from  6.5%  in  the earlier period  to  no  less  than 
31.9%  in  1982. 
So  the position  is clear.  We  are  not  transgressing  the 
GATT  rules.  The  issue  in  reality  is  a  different  one. 
What  many  in  Washington  seem  to  be  saying  is  that it 
would  be  a  great  convenience  to American  farmers  if  we 
were  to get off  the  world  market.  The  Community  has  no 
intention of  doing  so.  If  we  did  so  we  would  throw 
several million  European  farmers  on  the  breadline  - in 
addition  to  the  12 million of  our citizens already 
unemployed.  We  are  going  to  stay on  the  world market. 
But  we  are  not  going  to  hog  the  world market.  This  seems 
to us  a  reasonable  line. 
Let  us  hope  that bearing  in  mind  these  facts  and 
building  on  the  US-EEC  agricultural  conversations  in 
January  and  February  we  can  find  solutions within  our 
existing  systems  which  can  accommodate  our  problems. 
Individual  actions  can  easily produce  counter-reactions, 
and  these  can  escalate.  But  jaw-jaw,  as  Churchill  once 
said  to Stalin,  is better  than  war-war. 